University of Miami Law Review
Volume 33
Number 5 Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsh Meyer
Lecture Series

Article 6

9-1-1979

The Federal Securities Code: Some Comments on Process and
Outcome
Richard R. West

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
Richard R. West, The Federal Securities Code: Some Comments on Process and Outcome, 33 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1485 (1979)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol33/iss5/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

The Federal Securities Code: Some Comments on
Process and Outcome
RICHARD

R.

WEST*

The author questions the merits of certain aspects of the
Code and the process which produced them. He examines the
tender offer provisions in the Code and offers empirical evidence
which demonstrates that regulation of tender offers under the
Williams Act has increased the costs of tenders and has hurt
investors. Noting that the goal of the Code is to "protect" investors, he concludes that the tender offer provisions fail to attain
that goal.
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INTRODUCTION

In a moment or two it will become quite obvious that I am
rather skeptical about the merits of certain aspects of the proposed
Federal Securities Code, as well as about the processes that produced it. I do not apologize for this. Indeed, I suspect I was asked
to participate in this event primarily because its organizers assumed
that my views might include some critical dimensions. All the same,
it is important to state at the outset that I am basically very supportive of the importance of a codification effort and of much of what
the proposed Code includes. It goes without saying that Professor
Loss and his colleagues deserve to be congratulated for their efforts.
There is no doubt that some will conclude that my comments
and criticisms are unfair. As an economist, I will concentrate on the
substantive economic aspects of the Code rather than on what is
generally referred to as the "lawyers' law." Furthermore, and in
spite of Mr. Wechsler's caveat that "[tihose who appraise the
product must compare it with the law as it now stands, not with the
statutes and their gloss as they would like to have them be,"' I will
engage in normative analysis. In defense of this, I would argue that
such analysis is quite relevant to improving our understanding of
the strengths and weaknesses of the Code. Moreover, I think a case
* Dean and Professor of Finance, Amos Tuck School of Business Administration.

1. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE viii
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can be made that a normative approach should be seen by all parties as
"cricket" at this juncture.
If the
project of The American Law Institute
had strictly
focused upon codification of the existing statutes-upon merely rearranging them in a systematic manner to achieve simplicity and
to eliminate duplication-one might accept the notion that comments regarding the substance of the Code were out of place. After
all, who would assert that a tailor ought to be criticized for the
color or texture of the cloth he is asked to fashion into a garment?
In this case, however, the "tailors" clearly went beyond cutting
and sewing. They not only chose some of the cloth but engaged in
spinning and weaving here and there. Indeed, in his introduction
to the proposed official draft of the Code, the "chief tailor," Professor Loss, said that one of the principal aims of the project was
the "reexamination of the entire scheme of investor protection
with a view to increasing its efficiency and doing so, in President
Roosevelt's words, 'with the least possible interference to honest
business.' "2 Given that Professor Loss (or at least his typesetter)
spelled the word principal with an "le," one must assume at least
from time to time, that this particular aim played a paramount role
in the codification effort.
In any event, it seems reasonable, at a gathering such as this,
to analyze all aspects of the Code from a normative perspective,
asking whether they can be expected to increase investor protection-however that phrase may be defined-in an efficient manner.
To avoid being accused of foul play, however, I will focus my remarks primarily on areas where the codifiers themselves made substantive changes in existing law. Presumably, such changes must
have reflected a judgment that amendments would have a particularly salutory effect on the fabric of investor protection.

II.

REEXAMINING THE SCHEME OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: THE
PROCESS

Before offering any observations about specific changes in the
Code, it seems appropriate to examine the process which produced
them. As a victim of what Michael Cohen and James March have
referred to as "a powerful overlearning with respect to rationality, "I
I would argue that any thorough reexamination of the securities
laws ought to begin with a discussion of goals and objectives. What
2. Id. at xv (quoting S.
Sess. (1933)).
3. M.

REP.

No. 47, at 607 and H.R. REP. No. 85, at 1-2, 73d Cong., 1st

COHEN & J. MARCH, LEADERSHIP AND AMBIGUrTY

226 (1974).
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is it that the laws should seek to accomplish? At what cost to honest
business should we protect investors? Indeed, what does it mean to
"protect" investors? Once having wrestled with questions such as
these, hopefully to the point where reasonable individuals might
reach some general agreement, the next logical step would be to
examine alternative approaches to the regulatory process. Only
after considering the pros and cons of the alternatives in some detail, would decisions regarding appropriate courses of action be
made. I realize, of course, that this is not the process by which
political decisions are usually made, nor is it the manner in which
the law generally evolves. Nonetheless, given that we are focusing
on a codification effort having a first principle of the type discussed
above, it seems to be a reasonable benchmark against which to
compare what was actually done.
The second step in this idealized process-that having to do
with the examination of the pros and cons of alternative courses of
action-is particularly important and often overlooked. There tends
to be a propensity among policymakers to assume that once agreement about broad objectives is achieved, the appropriate course of
action is obvious. All too often, however, this propensity results in
adopting policies that cannot possibly lead to the achievement of
the desired objectives.
Rational policy analysis, admittedly a normative concept, and
perhaps a naive one, calls for a dispassionate examination of
whether any given course of action-in this case any given change
in the securities laws-can be expected to achieve some desired
objective. It demands that alternatives be examined within some
theoretical context and that relevant empirical findings be given
their due.
Although I have not read each and every word of the various
drafts of the proposed Code, let alone been privy to any of the
discussions among the Reporter, consultants and advisors, my reading of the final product suggests that the process of the project left
something to be desired relative to the benchmark. Regardless of
how much (or how little) time and effort was devoted to an examination of the objectives of the Code, there seems to have been less than
adequate analysis of the degree to which existing regulations or
proposed changes would, in fact, lead to some desired results.
Throughout the proposed official draft there are notes that this or
that change was made "on the theory" that something was true or
desirable. But, there is no discussion of the merits of the theories
proposed or of their underlying logic or empirical foundations; nor
are the reasons for the rejection of alternative theories offered. Per-
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haps, all this was nothing more than an oversight, but I doubt it.
My reason for skepticism, incidentally, is very simple. The project was dominated by lawyers. The Reporter was a lawyer, of
course. But, so too were virtually all of the consultants and advisors.
While I have a high regard for members of the legal profession, I
would venture the opinion that a thorough reexamination of' the
entire scheme of investor protection ought to involve members of the
accounting profession, financial economists and representatives of
corporate America. Such individuals would not only provide different perspectives on the substantive issues, but also come to the task
with a rich knowledge of relevant empirical data. It is a pity that
they were not made part of the process, particularly given the acknowledgment by the Code that there are problems in the existing
statutes that do not "adequately reflect" economic and technological changes.

III.

THE QUALITY OF OUTCOME: AN ILLUSTRATION

Given the process followed by the codifiers, one might predict
that their substantive changes would not necessarily contribute to
the enhancement of investor protection. A reading of their final
product-at least my reading of it-suggests this prediction is valid.
I could illustrate this by focusing on a variety of issues contained in Parts IV through VI of the Code. In view of time constraints, however, and in order to do more than merely gloss over a
variety of subjects in a superficial manner, I will concentrate on one
particular issue-i.e., section 606 which deals with tender offers.
By way of introduction, let me ask you to remember that federal legislation concerning tenders is only slightly more than ten
years old. 4 It was initially proposed in 1965 by Senator Harrison
Williams. In the words of Aranow and Einhorn, the original Williams Bill was introduced "for the ostensible purpose of protecting
incumbent managements from 'industrial sabotage' resulting from
what were deemed to be reckless corporate raids on 'proud old companies.'" As such, it was "unique in that it represented perhaps
the first attempt to enact securities regulation designed primarily
for the issuer rather than the investor."' The initial version of the
4. The Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV.
1969).

& H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 64 (1973).
6. Id. When the original Williams Act was passed, it was thought that it was designed
to regulate cash tender offers. In fact, it did far more. It required extensive disclosures in stock
acquisitions, whether made through tender offers or at private placement; it gave the SEC
5. E. ARANOW
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bill, of course, failed to garner the support needed for passage. A
decendent was more fortunate, and, like the original bill, it too
embodied the notion that those who make tender offers are
typically pirates bent upon ousting competent managements.
Given the thrust of the Williams Bill, with its emphasis on
issuer protection, one might have thought that codifiers who wanted
to reexamine matters with an eye toward improving investor protection without interfering with honest business would have been reluctant to add to the burdens of those making tenders. Indeed, one
might even have hoped that they would have given serious consideration to rolling back the existing requirements.
What, in fact, did they do? In a note to section 607, the Reporter indicates that they "made only minimal changes in existing
law." What may seem minimal to one person, however, can be
regarded as quite substantial by others. I personally regard their
changes as significant and suspect that many others involved in the
process of mergers and acquisitions will agree.
The Code proposes that tenderers must comply with a new ten
day advance filing and publication requirement 8 that is, in the Reporter's words, "designed to reduce the element of surprise."' In
addition, it provides for "a considerable extension"'" in the minimum offer period." Clearly, then, despite the Reporter's comment
that section 606 should not sacrifice "the natural approach that is
essential in a free economy,"12 it goes some distance toward making
broad rulemaking power over purchases by a company of its own stock; and, as amended in
1970, it applied to exchange offers as well as cash tenders. One commentator expected its
broad proscription of fraud to be as fruitful a source of litigation in the tender offer area as
rule 10b-5 was in the area of purchase and sale of securities. See Brown, The Scope of the
Williams Act and its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAw. 1637, 1637 (1971).
7. FED. SEC. CODE § 607, Note (4). The provisions in the Code, which change existing
law, are largely the result of political compromise between the authors of the Code and the
states which have passed tender offer statutes. The Reporter admits that the state statutes
have substituted an anti-takeover philosophy for the neutrality emphasized by Congress. Id.
Note (2). Yet, the Code incorporates those aspects of the state regulatory scheme which its
authors thought would improve the regulatory scheme "without sacrificing the neutral approach that is essential in a free economy" and would facilitate the redemption contemplated
by § 1904(c). Id. Note (3). As the discussion below indicates, the adoption of these provisions
could have a substantial impact and certainly shifts the regulation from Congress' intended
position of neutrality.
8. Id. § 606(d)(1).
9. Id. § 607, Note (4)(f). The ten day advance filing requirement was taken from state
statutes.
10. Id. Note (4)(j).
11. Id. § 606(e).
12. Id. § 607, Note (3). The Williams Act was designed to protect investors through full
disclosure of the names, business associates and background of the offeror. Congress thought
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it even more difficult for tenders to be successful.'"
Whether or not these changes were intended to be minimal, the
codifiers must have recognized that they would, if adopted, increase
the difficulty of consummating a tender. This being the case, they
must have believed that fewer successful tenders would be in the
public interest. They offered no evidence, however, to support this
position; nor did they attempt to reconcile it with their statement
espousing the importance of "neutrality." Here, then, is a classic
example of an instance in which the codifiers neither carried out a
thorough theoretical analysis nor examined the relevant empirical
evidence. It seems clear that the types of changes proposed would
in fact add to the difficulties associated with consummating tenders.
that while takeovers should not be discouraged, they must be regulated. It believed that
disclosure of this information was necessary to inform investors of a possible takeover by a
well-run firm or by a firm of dubious character. In addition, Congress believed that disclosure
would provide both the offeror and the management with an eqtual opportunity fairly to
present their cases. Congress also noted, however, the necessity of taking "extreme care to
avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bid." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
13. The SEC recently released a series of proposed rules which, if adopted, would make
the completion of successful tenders more difficult. They would augment the present statutory requirements by providing specific filing requirements, delivery and disclosure requirements, nonexclusive dissemination provisions, additional substantive regulatory protections
with respect to certain tender offers, and antifraud provisions which would apply to any
tender offer. SEC Release Nos. 33-6022, 34-15548, 10575, [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 81,935 (Feb. 5, 1979).
For example, proposed rules 14d-1 to -5 define the duties of the target company and
bidder in disclosing and disseminating information between themselves and the shareholders
of the target company. These rules require substantially more disclosure than is required
under present law. In addition to imposing a greater burden on the acquiring company, it
should increase the costs of making a tender and present more opportunities to fall technically
outside the antifraud provisions.
These rules reflect the Commission's attitude toward tenders. Comments received on
similar rules proposed in 1976, SEC Release Nos. 33-5731, 34-12676 [1976-77 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,659 (Aug. 2, 1976), and, in particular on a proposed
rule requiring dissemination of information to all shareholders whose names appeared on the
shareholder list, questioned the Commission's authority to adopt such rules. The Commission
now claims that its proposed rule 14d-5, pertaining to shareholder lists, implements the
remedial purposes of the Act and is consistent with its legislative history. The Code dispells
any doubts about the Commission's power to enact rules such as these under § 606(c) and
the Reporter's notes comment on the reach of this general rulemaking provision: "[TJhe
'disclosure and dissemination' phrase makes explicit that the authority extends to requiring
that particular disclosures be made, not merely to regulating the content of those disclosures
that are in fact made." FED. SEC. CODE § 607 Note (3)(e). The provision specifically applies
to shareholder lists. With this rulemaking authority, therefore, in addition to the specific
provisions that make tenders more difficult, it is likely that the Commission will adopt rules
similar to those proposed, shifting the balance away from neutrality in favor of incumbent
management.
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Robert Smiley has reported that the requirements of the Williams Act have had a substantial impact on the costs of tenders,
increasing them by thirteen to twenty-seven percent. Reflecting on
the public policy implications of this finding, Smiley concluded as
follows:
Whether or not this was the desired effect of this piece of legislation is unclear (it probably was for some interest groups involved
in lobbying in favor of the Amendment). But this impact should
be considered the next time a legislative body begins consideration of a market mechanism which could (if left alone or encouraged) be instrumental in providing market imposed discipline on
managers ofU.S. firms."

°

Quite obviously, the codifiers either did not read Smiley's paper or
did not agree with his notion that increasing the costs of tenders
might not be in the public interest.
At the time the original Williams Act legislation was being
debated, many economists opposed passage,'" generally on the
grounds that tenders provide a "market imposed discipline" of the
type described by Smiley. Quite recently-in fact since the publication of the proposed official draft of the Code-a paper by Donald
Kummer and Ronald Hoffmeister provided powerful empirical sup14. Smiley, The Effects of the Williams Amendment and Other Factors on Transactions
Costs in Tender Offers, 3 INDUS. ORG. REV. 138, 145 (1975). Professor Smiley set up a model
of the tender offer process using a "state preference model" to develop a novel empirical
technique. By observing rates of return and risk measures, he was able to estimate, with ex
ante certainty, equivalent transaction costs in tender offers. These costs were then estimated
for each of 80 tender offers in the period of 1956-1970.
The basic premise for the model of the tender offer process used by Smiley was that a
tender offer was a risky investment. "The outcome of the offer may involve a large wealth
loss for the bidder, as well as the possibility of a large gain. Only when the probabilities of
possible outcomes . . . [were] such that the certainty equivalent present value of the investment [would] not result in a wealth loss, [would] an offer be forthcoming by a wealth
maximizing bidder." Id. at 139. All potential costs had to be taken into account and the
bidder had to be able to recover the expected value of the costs, in addition to the price paid
for the shares, before a bid would be made. Smiley measured these costs by assuming that
the shares of the target must have fallen below the potential maximum price by the expected
transactions costs.
15. See, Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
DUKE L.J. 231. Professor Manne was highly critical of the disclosure requirements in the
proposed Act. He advocated an unrestricted market for corporate control which, by itself,
would weed out incompetent and crooked management. In addition, he argued that protection for investors could best be achieved in a free market. "An unhampered and unregulated
market for corporate control will be far more effective in gaining efficient management for
shareholders than plans based on the idea of millions of unsophisticated shareholders making
intelligent decisions about the relative qualities of opposing management groups." Id. at 245.
See generally Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far? 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 687
(1978); Note, Tender Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under the Williams Act, 45
FORDHAM

L.

REV.

51 (1976).
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port for this position. 6 The authors studied all cash tender offers
made between January 1956 and June 1974 for firms on the New
York Stock Exchange meeting certain criteria-eighty-eight firms
in all. Using methodology that is now a standard part of the tool kit
of financial economists, they tested the following hypotheses: (1)
that investors in the common stock of target firms generally experienced abnormally low returns in the period prior to a takeover attempt; (2) that the stockholders of firms which resisted a tender
generally experienced particularly abnormal low returns prior to a
takeover attempt; and (3) that successful tenders lead to an improved wealth position for the shareholders of both firms involved. 7
Overall, their results supported all three hypotheses, thereby leading them to make the following statement about the process of tendering:
Bidding firms seek out targets for take-over. The focus is on the
purchase of the rights to manage the assets of the target firm. In
order to obtain those rights a premium is paid to the target's
existing shareholders. However, in spite of the premium paid the
value of the expected cash stream increases. Evidently capital
market participants believe that the purchases of the target's
16. Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J. FIN.
505 (1978).
17. Id. at 506-07. The authors engaged in a quantitative economic analysis of cash tender
offers to 88 firms, deriving their data from the Austin-Fishman Data Base, the Wall Street
JournalIndex for 1958-74 and the SEC StatisticalBulletin. As well as evaluating conditions
of all target firms, the authors distinguished firms where the incumbent management was
passively amenable to takeover, firms where management successfully resisted takeover and
those in which management unsuccessfully resisted the takeover. The overall data, after
statistical analysis, revealed that "firms subject to take-over experience abnormally low
returns prior to the announcement of the attempted take-over," with a cumulative average
abnormal return (C.A.R.) of -.094 within three months prior to the announcement of takeover.
Id. at 509. Firms with passive management, where the takeover was successful, experienced
a similar although not as great a C.A.R., as did firms that unsuccessfully resisted takeover.
Target firms that successfully resisted takeover experienced higher preannouncement
C.A.R.'s while, subsequent to the announcement, the C.A.R. failed to return to its previous
level.
The authors concluded that their first hypothesis was confirmed for the firms which fell
into the "resist" category. Id. at 511. They suggested that the low returns were "reflective of
unrealized gains subject to the replacement of incumbent management." Id. at 514.
In addition, the authors confirmed the hypothesis that firms involved in target takeovers
where management resisted, displayed poorer performance (prior to the takeover) than do
friendly takeovers. Clearly, if the low returns are due to inefficiency, incumbent management
will resist takeover because it will mean the loss of their positions, and in offering this
resistance it will deplete the already low and inefficiently used corporate resources. The
hypothesis, therefore, that shareholder wealth in both the target and bidding firms will
improve upon successful tender was clearly established.
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shares and the right to control the firm's assets will generate an
increase in cash flows that exceeds the cash outlay required."

If we are to believe Kummer and Hoffmeister-and their results
certainly convince me-it would seem that the typical successful
tender offer is a classic example of a very rare event. Namely, it is
an instance in which there are winners but no losers. Strictly speaking, this is not quite true. There are losers, but they do not happen
to be among the investors in either firm. Instead, they are managers
of the firm that is the target of a tender. More often than not, they
lose their positions as a result of the tender.
In view of the probable consequences of a successful tender offer
on the fortunes of the managers of target firms, it is surprising that
they frequently resist being acquired. Kummer and Hoffmeister
report, for example, that approximately one-fourth of the takeover
candidates in their sample resisted a tender. 9 If resistance leads to
an improved bid for the shares of the firm, it may be justified as
being in the interest of the shareholders. When it results, however,
in an unsuccessful tender, the outcome is less fortunate for them.
In either event, of course, the managers use the resources of the firm
to resist. In other words, whether motivated by a desire to assist the
shareholders in obtaining a better price or simply by a desire to keep
their jobs, they deplete the shareholders' equity.
By adding an advance filing provision and extending the length
of tenders, 0 the changes in the proposed Code would give manage18. Id. at 514.
19. Id. at 509-10. Resistance may occur for various reasons; most commonly it is the
desire of the tdrget's management to maintain its power. A bidding firm must successfully
overcome this resistance in order to effectuate the takeover.
This resistance suggests two valuation consequences. First, only a larger bid
premium to the target's shareholders will insure the success of a contested takeover. Second, a larger premium may only be offered in anticipation of large gains.
These conclusions suggest that target firms involved in unfriendly take-overs may
be relatively poor performers prior to a take-over attempt when compared to the
prior performance of target firms involved in friendly take-overs, ceteris paribus.
Id. at 506.
20. The Code provision regulating the minimum offer period is similar to the Commission's proposed rules. The proposed rules are promulgated under the authority granted in §
14(e) of the Williams Act. The rules require that an offer remain open for a minimum of 30
business days and run concurrently with a 10 business day minimum on any offer of increased
consideration. 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,295. This is expanded from an earlier proposal
of 15 business days. SEC Release Nos. 33-5731, 34-12676 [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 80,659 (Aug. 2, 1976). Two policies espoused by the Commission for the rule
are: (1) providing security holders with full disclosure to make an investment in an unpressured manner and (2) providing the target company management an opportunity to counter
the proposed offer. Securities Act Release No. 6022, [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
81,935.
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ments more time to resist tenders, thereby permitting them to use
up more of the resources of the firm and reducing the probability of
a successful tender. Is that really what a reexamination of the entire
scheme of investor protection should do? Frankly, I doubt it.

IV.

A

CONCLUDING REMARK

In my introduction, I indicated that I had reservations about
both the processes used by the codifiers and the outcome of their
efforts. The reasons for these reservations should now be apparent
as should my conclusions. Despite Professor Loss' statement regarding the aims of the Code, I seriously doubt whether it is the product
of a thorough reexamination of the entire scheme of investor protection. Instead, I would argue that it is the result of a magnificent
effort to improve the "lawyers' law" and a haphazard analysis of the
sustantive economic fabric of the existing securities laws. In the
interest of full and honest disclosure, the Reporter's statement of
the principal aims of the codification effort ought to be modified,
or a truly thorough examination of the entire scheme of investor
protection should be initiated.
The Code, by its inclusion of § 606(e), has made the same assumption as the Commission-that the longer period does not tip the scales in favor of management. It provides for a
20-day effective period with a 15-day minimum if there is a change in consideration. Though
20 days is better than 30, the Code gives the Commission authority to extend the minimum
periods by rule. Again, it is likely that the end result will be even more restrictive and more
favorable to management in light of the proposed rules.

